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Abstract—There is ample evidence which shows that social me-
dia users struggle to make appropriate access control decisions
while disclosing their information and smarter mechanisms are
needed to assist them. Using profile information to ascertain
similarity between users and provide suggestions to them
during the process of making access control decisions has
been put forth as a possible solution to this problem. This
paper presents an empirical study aimed at identifying the
minimal subset of attributes which are most suitable for being
used to create profile vectors for the purpose of predicting
access control decisions. We begin with an exhaustive list of
30 profile attributes and identify a subset of 2 profile attributes
which are shown to be sufficient in obtaining similarity between
profiles and predicting access control decisions with the same
accuracy as previous models. We demonstrate that using this
pair of attributes will help mitigate the challenges encountered
by similarity based access control mechanisms.
1. Introduction
Defining appropriate access controls during information
disclosure is a challenging task for all social media users.
The plethora of contacts most users have and the different
life facets (such as work, family, etc.) represented by these
contacts only add to the user’s complications. Moreover,
social media applications have often been found to be
falling short in supporting and assisting users in making
access control decisions [1]. Without adequate assistance,
users often make erroneous choices when making such de-
cisions [2]. Mainstream social media sites such as Facebook
and Google+ have made an effort to mitigate this problem by
assisting users in managing their friend networks by creating
Lists 1 and Circles [3] respectively. However, recent research
findings suggest that hardly any users employ these features
when making access control decisions [4].
There are some proposed approaches which suggest that
information about the content being shared (text, photos,
etc.) can be used to assist users in making appropriate
access control decisions [5]. This “metadata” can either be
automatically generated based on analysis of the content
1. https://en-gb.facebook.com/help/135312293276793/
or provided by the user in the form of annotations. Both
methods suffer from the significant challenge of accurately
defining the content which can then be used to assist the
users. Moreover, the dynamic nature of content creation
in social media necessitates real-time analysis to be quick
which further accentuates the demands on mechanisms re-
lying on automatic definition of content. Conversely, if the
responsibility to annotate the content is on the user, it creates
an additional burden on them.
Another approach of providing assistance to users in
making access control decisions relies on creating sugges-
tions based on learning the user’s access control behavior.
These suggestions rely on associations of a user’s friends
based on prior partitioning of the friend network [6] or
similarity between their profiles [7], [8]. Such “Similarity
based Access Control” rely on “Profile Vectors” which
encapsulate the information stored in social media profiles
of individuals in a manner which captures the similarity
between them. This similarity can then be used to either
group users together in communities [8], [9] or make
suggestions to assist the user in selecting an audience for
their content in real-time [7]. All profile similarity based
access control mechanisms, however, have to overcome
several limitations: 1) The information required to create
profile vectors should be processed in minimal time to assist
the user; 2) The information that is collected should be
easy to code into profile vectors; 3) There is a possibility
of encountering missing information for some attributes as
users often refrain from populating many fields on their
social media profiles [7] and 4) The information collection
for the purpose of creating these profile vectors should be
as less intrusive as possible. Thus, processing of personal
information and the users’ communication with their friends
should be minimal in any such mechanism.
Keeping these limitations in mind, it seems imperative
to identify the minimal subset of profile features which can
be used to accurately predict access control decisions and
make appropriate suggestions to the user. The endeavor is to
create an access control mechanism which provides accurate
suggestions with minimal profile information from the users
or their friends. All of the previous works which have used
profile information have based the choice of the set of
attributes solely on previous literature or qualitative analysis
of user responses. There is an absence of an evaluation of the
available profile attributes in social network infrastructures
to identify the optimal subset for the purpose of employing
user similarity for access control decisions. In this paper,
we bridge this gap by providing a systematic analysis of
all profile attributes available in social media profiles to
select the minimal subset most suitable for predicting access
control decisions with maximum possible accuracy.
Our findings help us in identifying a subset of 2 profile
attributes, namely Total Friends and Mutual Friends.
We demonstrate that a classifier created using these two
attributes can predict access control decisions with the
same accuracy as previous models and improves upon them
to mitigate the discussed challenges due to the following
advantages:
• The time taken to simply fetch profile information
relevant to these attributes using Facebook API calls
is approximately one-sixth of the time taken to fetch
information relevant to subsets of attributes from the
quickest among previous works.
• Both attributes facilitate easier creation of profile vectors
because they do not require any coding and can be
directly fetched from the profiles.
• The attributes do not rely on information such as location,
workplace and age which can often be left blank or
misreported by the users.
• The attributes do not require information about the users’
communication (posts, messages, etc.) and hence makes
the information gathering less intrusive as compared to
previous approaches.
2. Background and Related Work
The lack of usability of access control mechanisms
in social media has attracted a lot of research in recent
times. One of the methods in which users can be assisted
in making appropriate access control decisions is by en-
hancing automatic contact grouping mechanisms. This has
been acknowledged by mainstream social media sites like
Facebook and Google+ who have created “Smart Lists”
and Circles [3] for the users to assist them in managing
and organizing their contacts. However, this has not solved
the problem of defining access controls as the majority of
users do not employ these mechanisms when making access
control decisions [4]. This suggests that smarter solutions
are required to alleviate the burden on the users.
Social media profiles are often created to contain a
plethora of information about individuals. There are nu-
merous ways in which this information can be leveraged to
enhance access control mechanisms. One particular way is
to use profile information to calculate relationship closeness
or “tie-strength” to define relationships between individuals
in a social network. Tie-strength between individuals can be
measured and modeled using various factors such as network
structure (community membership), extent of communica-
tion and similarity of profile data [11]. This can be used
to assist users while making access control decisions. For
example, a user may choose to disclose something to only
his “close friends” (based on the tie-strength calculation) and
deny access to “distant” or “weak” relationships. Fogues et
al. [10] created BFF (Best Friends Forever) which contained
a “tie-strength module” which calculates the tie-strength
between individuals based on a subset of profile attributes
outlined by Gilbert and Karahalios [11]. BFF chose to ignore
profile attributes such as location or work as they asserted
that these are often left blank by social media users and
showed that the results are not substantially affected by
removing these profile attributes. Our work considers these
attributes as we wanted to examine as comprehensive a list
of attributes as possible. We handle missing information in
the way we code variables to capture the similarity between
individuals as explained later in the paper.
Profile information can also be used to create profile
vectors to define individuals on a social network and capture
the similarity between them. This similarity can then be
used to mine appropriate privacy policies for a user under
the assumption that similar users will have similar privacy
policies [9]. Another important usage of profile similarity
is in creating “profile based grouping” mechanisms to assist
users in managing their friend networks. Profile information
can be coded to capture similarity between users which can
be used to partition a user’s friend network by grouping
similar friends together [7], [8]. This method can be used to
create static groups a-priori which can then be leveraged by
users to make access control decisions [8]. An alternative
method is to use profile similarity to provide “on-demand
group creation” as shown in ReGroup [7] which provides
suggestions to the user at the time of making access control
decisions by learning from their previous choices. These
suggestions are based on calculating the similarity between
the profiles of the user’s friends. However, the evaluation
shown in their paper is based on qualitative feedback and
measures factors such as time taken to form groups and the
size of the groups created by the participants to ascertain
usability. It is claimed that manually labeled dataset for
examining the accuracy of the groups was unavailable for
their evaluation [7]. Additionally, all previous works fail to
identify the minimal set of profile attributes most suitable
to predict access control decisions. We bridge these gaps
with our work which uses empirical data to identify the
most suited set of profile features which can be used to
predict access control decisions for individuals. We use a
list of 30 profile attributes, constructed from all the available
profile information using the Facebook API, as a basis for
our analysis. We show in Table 1 that we consider all
the attributes considered by some of the above mentioned
approaches (we could not compare our list with works which
did not explicitly provide the list of profile attributes they
used) as well as some extra attributes available in social
media infrastructure in addition to them.
TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF THE SUBSETS OF PROFILE ATTRIBUTES USED TO CREATE PROFILE VECTORS IN THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
No. Profile Feature Type Our Work Social Circles [8] ReGroup [7] BFF [10]
1 Friendship Duration Derived 4 4 4 4
2 Recency of Communication Derived 4 4 4 4
3 Amount seen together (photos together) Derived 4 4 4 4
4 Wall Messages Derived 4 4 4 4
5 Inbox Messages Derived 4 4 4 4
6 Mutual Friends Direct 4 4 4 4
7 Gender Direct 4 4 4 6
8 Age Direct 4 4 4 6
9 Family Membership Direct 4 4 4 6
10 Home Town Direct 4 4 4 6
11 Home State Direct 4 4 4 6
12 Home Country Direct 4 4 4 6
13 Current City Direct 4 4 4 6
14 Current State Direct 4 4 4 6
15 Current Country Direct 4 4 4 6
16 Education Direct 4 4 4 4
17 Work Direct 4 4 4 6
18 Likes Direct 4 4 6 4
19 Events Direct 4 4 6 6
20 Politics Direct 4 4 6 6
21 Religion Direct 4 4 6 6
22 Interests Direct 4 4 6 6
23 Links Shared Derived 4 6 6 4
24 Music Direct 4 6 6 6
25 Movies Direct 4 6 6 6
26 Languages Direct 4 6 6 6
27 Sports Direct 4 6 6 6
28 Total Friends Direct 4 6 6 4
29 Friend Difference Direct 4 6 6 6
30 Age Difference Direct 4 4 4 6
3. Method
This research experiment was conducted at Lancaster
University. Participants were invited via email, posters and
word of mouth. Details about the privacy implications and
the overall objectives of the project were communicated to
the registered participants as per the guidelines prescribed by
the Ethics department at the Research Support Office (RSO)
in Lancaster University2. After appropriate ethics clearance,
participants were invited to use a Facebook application
designed and developed by the researchers specifically for
this research project.
3.1. Experiment
The application used for the experiment was built using
the Facebook API to fetch information from the participants’
profile and their friend connections. All this data was then
stored in secure databases for subsequent analysis.
Five photos were randomly downloaded from Facebook
profiles of the participants by the application to be presented
to the user for making access control decisions. In addition,
the participants were asked to select and bring five other
photos which they hadn’t previously uploaded on Facebook.
This was done to avoid a scenario where a user selects an
2. http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/resources/ethics/procedures.htm
audience for a photo during the study for which they had
already received comments and likes as that may have in-
fluenced their choice of audience members. The participants
were also advised to choose photos which were personal
(either included them or a family member) or considered
sensitive so that they had a privacy implication. Thus, in
total, each participant had to make access control decisions
for 10 photos. The different stages of the user study were:
1) The participants logged into the application using their
Facebook credentials. They were then alerted about
the data the application would access and asked for
explicit consent before moving on.
2) They were shown 10 photos (5 from Facebook and 5
they brought as detailed earlier) sequentially on the
screen, each on an individual page. The participants
were then asked to select an audience for the photo
from an alphabetically sorted friend list to imitate the
organization Facebook uses to show friend lists to
its users. The friends were not grouped in any way
to avoid bias (even preset groups such as Facebook
‘lists’ were ignored). They were mandated to choose
at least one audience member for each photo before
progressing to the next step. The participants were
instructed to select each and every friend that they
would want to grant access to the photo. They were
also explicitly told that any friend who is not selected
would be denied access to the photo.
Once the participants selected all the audiences, these
access control decisions were stored in a secure database
to be used later as the ground truth for the analyses. The
detailed list of profile attributes that were obtained by coding
the information collected during the study are shown in
Table 1.
Due to the Facebook API3, only the profile information
of users who use an application (and explicitly provide data
access permissions) is available for collection. To mitigate
this, we particularly encouraged groups of people to par-
ticipate in the study so that a particular participant would
have some Facebook friends also participating in the study
which would enable us to get their profile information.
The users were not informed as to which of their friends’
information we would be able to access. The developed
application asked the users’ consent to access information of
ALL their Facebook friends as we did not want the users to
pay special attention towards their friends who were fellow
participants while making their access control decisions.
We particularly had 23 participants in total out of which
14 (61%) were female. The average age of the participants
was 32 years (s.d=10, max=61, min=23). Considering each
available friend profile of the 23 participants (2-5 friends per
participant) and all photos for which they selected audiences,
our dataset contained a total of 689 access control decisions.
This constituted our final manually labeled dataset which is
used as ground truth for the analysis of the profile attributes.
3.2. Coding the Profile Features
The profile information collected during the user study
had to be converted into profile vectors for each user and
their friends to capture the similarity between them. We
aimed to get as many profile attributes as possible using
the Facebook API 4. We considered all the fields which
consist of information about the individual but chose to
ignore descriptive fields such as “About Me” and “User
Bio”. We also did not include “Relationship Status” and
“Significant Other” as none of our participants had disclosed
them on their profiles. The attributes listed in Table 1 are
categorized in the following two types:
• Direct: These attributes can be directly fetched from the
Facebook profile of the user or the friend. No calculation
or aggregation is required.
• Derived: These attributes are created by aggregating dif-
ferent forms of communication (for eg: posts, messages
or photos) between a user and a particular friend.
22 out of the 30 profile attributes shown in Table 1 are
Direct attributes and are fetched directly from the Facebook
profiles. Intuitively, the computational cost of creating pro-
file vectors is minimized if a large number of attributes
are Direct as opposed to Derived. Thus, the method of
3. https://developers.facebook.com/docs/apps/upgrading
4. https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/user
obtaining the attribute is an important factor to consider
while evaluating the profile attributes.
The coding of profile features in our work is most
similar to [8] as they also looked to create vectors based on
similarity of profiles though we consider some additional
attributes which were not included by them as shown in
Table 1. The various attributes were coded in different ways
depending on the type of information they contain in order
to capture the similarity between a user and his friends.
• Friendship Duration and Recency of Communication
between a particular user and a specific friend were
calculated by counting the number of days since the first
and latest communication respectively.
• Amount seen together, Wall messages and Inbox
messages are all coded by simply counting the number
of interactions shared by the user and a particular friend.
A zero value indicates that no interaction took place
between them during the time for which the data was
collected.
• Mutual friends, Links shared and Events denote the
common friends, links and events attended by a user and
a particular friend.
• Gender was coded as a binary variable. Here, ‘1’
indicates that the user and the friend had the same gender
while a ‘0’ indicates a dissimilarity.
• Age and Total friends were taken directly from the users’
profiles. We also calculated the difference (absolute
value) between the user’s age and a friend’s age as a new
variable called Age Difference. This gives us a measure
of the gap between the user and a potential audience
member in terms of their age. A similar calculation
was done for Total Friends to create the variable Friend
Difference.
• Family membership was coded as a binary variable where
a ‘1’ indicates that the particular friend is disclosed as a
family member of the user while a ‘0’ indicates that no
such family relationships have been found for the friend
and the user. This includes cases where the user did not
disclose family relationships on Facebook.
• The attributes numbered 10 to 27 in Table 1 were
coded to represent the number of common entries. For
example, if a user and a friend had exactly one common
educational institution, a ‘1’ value was put for that
variable. A ‘0’ value captures both non-matches and
missing entries. Missing entries were coded as 0 to
ensure that we maximize the effect of matches between
the values while capturing the similarity between profiles.
TABLE 2. CLASSIFIER CONSIDERING ALL 30 PROFILE ATTRIBUTES SHOWN FOR EACH ALGORITHM
Condition Classification Algorithm Class Instances TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure
Unfiltered Data
Naive Bayes
1 211 0.597 0.219 0.450 0.597 0.514
0 478 0.781 0.403 0.866 0.781 0.821
Total 689 0.739 0.360 0.770 0.739 0.750
Support Vector Machines
1 64 0.365 0.011 0.906 0.365 0.520
0 625 0.989 0.635 0.838 0.989 0.907
Total 689 0.845 0.491 0.854 0.845 0.818
Random Forest
1 135 0.642 0.062 0.756 0.642 0.694
0 554 0.938 0.358 0.897 0.938 0.917
Total 689 0.869 0.290 0.864 0.869 0.865
Spread Subsample Filter
Naive Bayes
1 206 0.585 0.213 0.451 0.585 0.510
0 483 0.787 0.415 0.863 0.787 0.823
Total 689 0.740 0.369 0.768 0.740 0.751
Support Vector Machines
1 70 0.371 0.021 0.843 0.371 0.515
0 619 0.979 0.629 0.838 0.979 0.903
Total 689 0.839 0.489 0.839 0.839 0.814
Random Forest
1 132 0.604 0.068 0.727 0.604 0.660
0 557 0.932 0.396 0.887 0.932 0.909
Total 689 0.856 0.320 0.850 0.856 0.851
Class Balancer Filter
Naive Bayes
1 325.4 0.654 0.291 0.692 0.654 0.673
0 363.6 0.709 0.346 0.672 0.709 0.690
Total 689 0.682 0.318 0.682 0.682 0.682
Support Vector Machines
1 312.4 0.692 0.215 0.763 0.692 0.726
0 376.6 0.785 0.308 0.718 0.785 0.750
Total 689 0.738 0.262 0.740 0.738 0.738
Random Forest
1 341 0.748 0.240 0.757 0.748 0.753
0 348 0.760 0.252 0.751 0.760 0.756
Total 689 0.754 0.246 0.754 0.754 0.754
Cost Sensitive Classifier
Naive Bayes
1 239 0.616 0.266 0.410 0.616 0.492
(Cost = 2)
0 450 0.734 0.384 0.864 0.734 0.794
Total 689 0.707 0.357 0.760 0.707 0.724
Support Vector Machines
1 111 0.509 0.057 0.730 0.509 0.600
0 578 0.943 0.491 0.865 0.943 0.903
Total 689 0.843 0.390 0.834 0.840 0.833
Random Forest
1 168 0.673 0.115 0.637 0.673 0.654
0 521 0.885 0.327 0.900 0.885 0.892
Total 689 0.836 0.278 0.839 0.836 0.838
4. Results
The data collected during the user study included the
profile information of the participants and their friends as
well as the access control decisions taken by the participants
during the experiment. The profile information was coded,
as has been described, to create profile attributes to be used
to ascertain similarity between profiles. The access control
decisions made by the participants were coded as ‘1’ (for
“allow”) and ‘0’ (for “deny”). Recall that we want to identify
a subset of profile attributes which are most suitable for
predicting access control decisions. We start by using the
list of all 30 profile attributes to create the classifier before
moving on to identify the minimal subset of profile attributes
most suitable for predicting access control decisions.
4.1. Prediction of Access Control Decisions
We tried 3 different classification algorithms: Naive-
Bayes [12], Support Vector Machines [13] and Random
Forest [14]. All algorithms were implemented using Weka
[15] with 10 fold cross validation. We started with a base-
line condition of using all the 30 profile attributes in the
classifier.
Our dataset consisted of 689 access control decisions
from 23 users. Out of this, 159 were “allow” (coded as
class ‘1’) while 530 were “deny” (coded as class ‘0’).
Thus, we observed some imbalance between the two classes
and decided to implement different well-established class
balancing methods [16] to understand if they could have an
effect on the accuracy of the classifier. The different modes
of operation of the classifier shown in Table 2 are:
• Unfiltered: The complete input data consisting of all 689
decisions was considered “as-is” without any filtering in
this setting.
• Spread Subsample Filter: This is a filter implemented
in Weka which allows maximum “spread” between the
two classes in our analysis. This method does not create
artificial instances of the rarer class (‘1’ in our case)
but simply redistributes the frequency in a way which
balances the classes.
• Class Balancer Filter: This method introduces synthetic
instances of the rarer class to balance the dataset. This is
also denoted by the fractional numbers in the “Instances”
column of Table 2.
• Cost-Sensitive Classifier: We employed “Cost sensitive
learning” [17], [18] which penalizes any instance of
class ‘1’ classified as class ‘0’ in our case. After several
iterations, we found that selecting a cost value of 2
provided the best results. Increasing cost further would
result in worse overall accuracy as it increases the false
positive rate.
The results in Table 2 show that Random Forest was
the best performing algorithm as it has the highest overall
F-measure for all conditions. We see that using the Class
Balancer filter improves accuracy of the ‘1’ class but reduces
the overall accuracy of the Random Forest classifier. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that for Naive-Bayes classifier,
the Spread Subsample filter has a marginally higher accu-
racy (0.751) as compared to the unfiltered setting (0.750).
Similarly, for SVM we observe that using the Cost Sensitive
Classifier (0.833) produces higher accuracy than the default
setting (0.818). Overall, we can observe that Random Forest
is the most suitable classification algorithm for our data and
we use it to perform further analysis in the rest of the paper.
The best accuracy provided by Random Forest is in the
unfiltered setting which is 86.5%. We use this as a baseline
accuracy provided by a classifier using all 30 attributes.
4.2. IMPROVE
The main objective of the research was to identify the
minimal profile vector to be used for similarity based access
control. We used Weka [15] to calculate the “information
gain” for each profile attribute to understand how they con-
tribute to the classifier. The 30 profile attributes are ranked
according to the information gain value in Table 3. We can
see from the table that Amount Seen Together has the highest
information gain (0.213). There are 10 profile attributes
which do not provide any information gain (attributes 21-30
in Table 3).
In order to identify the minimal subset of profile at-
tributes, we selected the first 5 profile attributes with the
highest information gain. These are Amount Seen Together
(0.213), Total Friends (0.190), Mutual Friends (0.182),
Friendship Duration (0.175) and Likes (0.174) (see Table
3). We systematically created classifiers with all possible
combinations of these 5 profile attributes using Random
Forest algorithm with the aim of producing an accuracy of
86.5% that would match that of the classifier created with
all 30 attributes as shown earlier. We started by using all 5
identified attributes to create a classifier and found that it
produced the desired accuracy of 86.5%. We then proceeded
to try all possible permutations and combinations of these 5
attributes to try and find a minimal set which matches this
maximum accuracy (86.5%). The only combinations of less
than 5 attributes that produced the same accuracy of 86.5%
were (Total Friends,Mutual Friends) and (Mutual Friends,
Likes). We did not find any attribute which could produce
the same accuracy when taken individually.
When we compare these two pairs of profile attributes,
we find that they both contain Mutual Friends. Thus, we
TABLE 3. PROFILE ATTRIBUTES RANKED ACCORDING TO
INFORMATION GAIN
No. Profile Attribute Information Gain
1 Amount seen together 0.213
2 Total Friends 0.190
3 Mutual Friends 0.182
4 Friendship Duration 0.175
5 Likes 0.174
6 Friend Difference 0.154
7 Age Difference 0.107
8 Movies 0.102
9 Links Shared 0.096
10 Wall Messages 0.071
11 Events 0.067
12 Interests 0.050
13 Recency of Communication 0.045
14 Home Town 0.037
15 Age 0.036
16 Current State 0.034
17 Current City 0.032
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Figure 1. Comparison of overall F-measures for classifier with all attributes
and classifier with the pair of identified attributes for all modes of operation
using Random Forest algorithm
have a choice between Total Friends and Likes in order to
finalize the selection of attributes. Considering the process of
coding these two variables to create profile vectors, we find
that Total Friends can be directly fetched as a numeric value
from a user’s profile and used “as-is” in the profile vector.
Alternatively, in order to code Likes to capture similarity
between two users, the list of pages liked by them needs
to retrieved and compared to count the number of pages
liked by both of them. This resultant value is then used
in the profile vector. Thus, considering the comparatively
more complex coding procedure for Likes as compared to
Total Friends, we select (Mutual Friends,Total Friends)
Figure 2. Comparison of overall F-measures for all classifiers (unfiltered data) listed per algorithm
as the minimal set of profile attributes which can be used to
accurately predict access control decisions.
We also tested the classifier created by using the pair of
attributes (Mutual Friends,Total Friends) in all the operating
modes to account for the class imbalance as we had done
with the entire list of 30 attributes. The comparison between
the performance of the classifier created using these two
attributes and that created with all 30 attributes is shown in
Figure 1. It can be seen from the figure that the unfiltered
dataset performs best with Random Forest algorithm for the
entire set of 30 attributes as well as the identified subset of
two profile attributes.
4.3. Comparison with Previous Approaches
We show the comparison of overall F-measure values
for our classifiers (both baseline and enhanced setting using
only 2 attributes) with the profile attributes used by Social
Circles [8], ReGroup [7] & BFF [10] in Figure 2. It can
be seen that all classifiers produce identical performance
for Random Forest algorithm and this also has the high-
est accuracy (86.5%). Thus, we can clearly see that our
identified pair of profile attributes is sufficient in replicating
the accuracy of previous models for the best performing
algorithm and adding further attributes to these 2 does not
improve the accuracy of the classifier at all.
Another important factor to be considered while eval-
uating profile attributes in our dataset is the temporal cost
on a system that would employ these profile vectors to try
and predict access control decisions. This would include the
time taken to fetch the profile information from Facebook
and then the time and computation required to code this
information to create profile vectors as described earlier in
section 3. We show a comparison of the estimated time5
taken to fetch the profile information necessary to create
the profile vectors containing (Mutual Friends,Total Friends)
and the subset of profile attributes used by Social Circles [8],
ReGroup [7] & BFF [10] in Figure 3. The time was calcu-
lated by creating 50 API calls to fetch the corresponding
subset of profile attributes and taking the average for each
proposed mechanism. As can be seen from the figure, using
5. We ran API calls for a Facebook profile with 320 friends with default
settings
Figure 3. Time (in seconds) required to fetch profile information using
Facebook API corresponding to each subset of profile attributes
our identified pair (Mutual Friends,Total Friends) takes far
less time (about one-sixth of the next best) than it would take
to fetch attributes corresponding to the other approaches.
This is mainly due to the fact that our approach does not
use any communication information (such as wall messages,
inbox messages, etc.) which require more time as compared
with “direct” profile attributes such as mutual friends and
total friends, which can be easily fetched from the profiles
themselves. Moreover, additional time will be required to
process the fetched information in the case of most of
the “derived” attributes which would further magnify the
difference in the temporal cost between the approaches.
5. Discussion
We iterated through different configurations of the clas-
sifier by using various combinations of the 5 top ranked
profile attributes with the highest information gain. We
found that using Mutual Friends and Total Friends was
sufficient to replicate the maximum accuracy (86.5%) of the
classifier created with all 30 attributes and that of previous
related works. We have also demonstrated that this subset of
attributes enhances previous profile similarity based access
control models in several ways:
Less time to fetch required information. We have shown
that the time required to fetch all relevant information
from Facebook profiles for the 2 attributes identified in this
study is about one-sixth of the time required for fetching
information required for the subset of profile attributes
corresponding to the quickest among previous works.
Easy creation of profile vectors. The “direct” attributes
Total Friends and Mutual Friends are both simply numeric
values which can be directly fetched from the users’ profiles
and incorporated in the profile vector without the need of
processing a lot of information. There are certain attributes
like Education, Workplace,etc. who can have different names
for the same entity which makes coding more difficult. For
both Total Friends and Mutual Friends, coding is unambigu-
ous as these are simply numeric values.
Less intrusive information gathering. The attributes do not
rely on communication (messages, wall posts, etc.) between
individuals and hence can be considered less intrusive than
other models which use such information. We showed earlier
that all previous models evaluated by us use this information
to create the profile vectors.
Cannot be left blank or faked. Both Total Friends and
Mutual Friends are attributes that are automatically updated
by the social media site itself. The users cannot manipulate
this data in any way. These attributes do not require access
to any identifying information such as Gender, Address, Age,
Workplace, etc., which are often left blank by users on their
profiles.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents an analysis of profile attributes using
empirical data and identifies a pair of profile attributes which
is found to be sufficient to calculate user similarity and
predict access control decisions. We show that a classifier
created with these attributes can replicate the accuracy of
classifiers based on sets of attributes used by previous works
in this area. Using these profile attributes to predict access
control decisions has several advantages and can contribute
towards mitigating some of the limitations of profile similar-
ity based access control mechanisms. The identification of
these attributes can contribute effectively towards the design
and implementation of future access control mechanisms.
An interesting future work is to investigate the effect of
the nature of the content (photos, posts, etc.) and evaluate
whether this information can be used to augment the profile
vector based approach for further accuracy as well as the use
of the 2 attributes identified in this study in an interactive
setting like ReGroup [7].
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